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Recent Development 
In Search of an Elixir: What Ails the 
Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe and How to 
Use the Competition Laws to Cure It 
Jonathan A. Hareid* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 28, 2008, the European Commission 
released its preliminary findings in a study investigating a 
perceived lack of competitiveness in the pharmaceutical 
industry in Europe.1 The study found, among other things, 
that brand-name drug manufacturers (which the report 
terms “originator companies”) engage in a variety of tactics 
to delay the entry of generic drugs onto the market.2 
The Commission’s study comes on the heels of its 2005 
decision against AstraZeneca.3 In that matter, the 
Commission found that AstraZeneca, a brand-name drug 
company, had violated Article 82 of the European 
Community Treaty and Article 54 of the European 
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 1. COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY PRELIMINARY REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preli
minary_report.pdf [hereinafter COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL]. 
 2. Id. at 7–10. 
 3. Commission Decision 2006/857, art. 82 and art. 54, 2006 O.J. 
(L332) 24 (EC and EEA)(summary of the decision; the full text of the 
decision is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37507/en.p
df) [hereinafter Commission Decision]. 
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Economic Area (“EEA”) by a pair of practices relating to 
patent extension and regulatory marketing authorization for 
the company’s proton-pump inhibitor drug, Losec.4 The 
Commission found that AstraZeneca’s practices were aimed 
at keeping generic competitors from entering the 
marketplace.5 
In the United States the Hatch-Waxman Act governs the 
relationship between brand-name and generic drug 
manufacturers and has been subject to various abuses by 
both camps. The intellectual property and regulatory 
framework is similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act in Europe, 
although with some differences. The AstraZeneca decision 
and the European Commission’s recent report suggest that 
just as the basic legal framework is similar in the United 
States and Europe, abuses of the framework, with anti-
competitive consequences, are another common element on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
The AstraZeneca decision provides precedent for 
applying the competition laws to restrain these abuses, and 
rightly so. However, while the Commission’s report seems to 
fault brand-name manufacturers for most of the problems, 
the true situation is likely more complex. Generic 
manufacturers are likely parties to some anti-competitive 
practices too. Moreover, the entire pharmaceutical industry 
is facing unique challenges in today’s economic and 
regulatory climate. Hence, this paper argues that the 
competition laws should be applied with care and attention 
to the true situation the industry faces. A complete solution 
involves a package of legal and regulatory overhaul of which 
judicious application of the competition laws is only a part. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”)6, a drug maker must obtain approval from the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) before a new drug is 
                                                          
 4. Id. at 198. 
 5. Id. at 195. 
 6. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
HAREID JA.  In Search of an Elixir: What Ails the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe and How 
to Use the Competition Laws to Cure It.  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 727-746. 
2009] IN SEARCH OF AN ELIXIR 729 
introduced into interstate commerce in the United States.7 
Approval requires submission of extensive preclinical and 
clinical studies demonstrating the drug’s safety, efficacy, 
and pharmacological properties.8 Hence, obtaining FDA 
approval is quite time-consuming as well as expensive. The 
total time required for drug testing and approval is between 
three and twenty years, with an average of about eight and 
a half years.9 Estimates of the total cost of drug approval 
vary, but at the high end the total cost could be over $800 
million.10 
To capture the most economic value from an approved 
drug, a drug company must obtain one or more patents on 
the drug. A patent gives the patentee the right to prevent 
others from making, using, selling, or importing the 
invention into the United States.11 This right generally lasts 
for twenty years from the date of filing of the patent 
application.12 The patent thus gives the patentee a limited 
monopoly in the invention. 
A drug company must obtain a patent shortly after 
discovery of the drug; excessive delay results in the 
company being statutorily barred from obtaining a patent.13 
However, the long process of getting FDA approval means 
that a large portion of the patent term will have run before 
the drug company gets FDA approval, and without FDA 
approval, the company cannot market the drug 
commercially. On the other hand, a competitor seeking to 
manufacture a generic version of the drug has to get FDA 
approval too, and any sort of testing would ordinarily be an 
infringement of the drug patent. So even after the drug 
patent expired, there would be a delay before any generic 
version could come on the market because only then could 
a generic drug maker begin to work on FDA approval. Thus, 
                                                          
 7. Id. § 355(a). 
 8. Id. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(c)(2)(ii), (v) (2008). 
 9. Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising 
Cost of New Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REV. DRUG 
DISCOVERY 417, 418 fig.1 (2004). The Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) maintains that the average time is 
14.2 years in recent decades.  Id. 
 10. Id. at  424–26. 
 11. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 12. Id. § 154(a)(2). 
 13. Id. § 102(b). 
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the regulatory process effectively distorts the commercial 
exclusivity associated with drug patents, both at the front 
end and the back end of the patent term.14 
Congress sought to solve these problems by passing the 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.15 The 
law amended the Patent Act and the FDCA in several 
respects. First, it enabled a drug manufacturer seeking 
approval of a generic version of an already-approved drug to 
file an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”), which 
would piggyback on the safety and effectiveness data 
submitted by the original manufacturer and thus 
streamline approval for generic drugs.16 This eliminated the 
necessity for generic manufacturers to do all the same 
testing on the same drug that the original manufacturer 
did, which seemed like wasteful duplication. Second, the 
law enabled patent term extension for products subject to 
FDA approval to enable the original manufacturer to regain 
some of the patent term lost during the FDA approval 
process.17 Third, the law created a safe harbor from patent 
infringement for uses of patented inventions to develop 
information for submission to the FDA for approval of a 
product, which enabled generic manufacturers to do the 
research and testing required for FDA approval while a 
brand-name drug is still under patent.18 
Finally, the law included provisions to expedite patent 
litigation over generic drugs and incentivize generic 
manufacturers to challenge drug patents. Specifically, the 
law provides that an ANDA filer must certify that (1) the 
original drug patent information has not been filed, (2) the 
patent has expired or will expire and the ANDA filer will not 
begin commercial marketing until after expiration, or (3) the 
patent is invalid or will not be infringed.19 If the ANDA filer 
asserts that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed 
                                                          
 14. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–71 (1990). 
 15. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as 
amended in 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)). 
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a), (f). 
 18. Id. § 271(e)(1). 
 19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
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(known as a Paragraph IV certification), this assertion is 
considered a technical act of patent infringement, and the 
brand-name drug company (the patentee) has forty-five 
days to bring a patent infringement suit against the ANDA 
filer; if no suit is brought, the FDA may approve the ANDA 
immediately.20 If the patent holder does file suit, the FDA 
may not approve the ANDA for thirty months21 or until a 
court declares the patent invalid.22 This enables patent 
disputes to go directly to court without waiting for the 
generic company to actually begin manufacture or file a 
declaratory judgment action. Moreover, to encourage 
Paragraph IV certifications, the first ANDA filer to 
successfully use a Paragraph IV certification gets a 180-day 
period of marketing exclusivity during which the FDA 
cannot approve other ANDAs.23 This incentivizes generic 
drug makers to challenge brand-name drug patents and 
presumably enhances the general availability of generic 
drugs, which are cheaper and benefit consumers. 
The ANDA provisions have been subject to a variety of 
practices with potential anti-competitive effects. Many of 
these practices are attempts by brand-name drug makers to 
delay the availability of generic versions of their drugs.24 
While some of these strategies are legitimate business 
tactics, others undoubtedly rise to the level of abuse of the 
Hatch-Waxman provisions or violation of the antitrust laws. 
For example, some brand-name manufacturers have 
obtained additional patents on their drugs in order to 
trigger additional thirty-month stays.25 One brand-name 
manufacturer tried unsuccessfully to assert copyright 
infringement against the ANDA filer because the generic 
manufacturer is required to use the same labeling as the 
original manufacturer.26 Sometimes brand-name 
                                                          
 20. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). 
 23. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 24. For an in-depth case study of two brand-name companies’ 
strategies to delay the onset of generic competition to their blockbuster 
drugs, see Daniel Gorlin, Staving Off Death: A Case Study of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Strategies to Protect Blockbuster Franchises, 63 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 823 (2008). 
 25. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 26. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare v. Watson Pharm., 
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manufacturers have tried to use an FDA procedure known 
as the citizen’s petition to prevent approval of an ANDA.27 
Brand-name manufacturers may suddenly withdraw their 
marketing authorization for particular dosage forms of a 
drug just before a generic manufacturer is about to obtain 
ANDA approval for that dosage form, thereby preventing the 
ANDA from being approved because there is no original 
application for the ANDA to piggyback on.28 
Finally, many patent infringement suits triggered by 
ANDAs are settled with a payment from the brand-name 
manufacturer to the generic company.29 Such a payment, 
called a “reverse” payment because it flows in the opposite 
direction a normal patent settlement payment would (i.e., 
from accused infringer to patentee), is frequently 
accompanied by settlement provisions that involve the 
generic manufacturer refraining from manufacturing the 
drug for a certain period of time. This raises antitrust 
scrutiny because the effect of such agreements is to reduce 
competition in the drug market. Courts and scholars have 
differed over how to approach the legality of reverse 
payments in light of the antitrust laws.30 
The abuses have not gone unnoticed by Congress or the 
Federal Trade Commission. In the Medicare Modernization 
Act of 2003, Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman 
provisions to curb some of the abusive practices, including 
limiting brand-name companies to one thirty-month stay 
per ANDA.31 The law mandates Federal Trade Commission 
                                                          
Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 27. See S. REP. NO. 109-266, at 136–47 (2006) (report for an 
appropriations bill noting a sharp increase in the occurrence of citizen 
petitions and attributing many of these petitions to attempts to delay the 
marketing of a generic version of an existing drug). 
 28. See Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d. 408, 
414–18 (D. Del. 2006). 
 29. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056 
(11th Cir. 2005); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th 
Cir. 2003). 
 30. For an excellent up-to-date summary of various approaches courts 
and scholars have taken to the reverse payment question, see Erica N. 
Andersen, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate over Reverse-
Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 
2003 and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015 (2008). 
 31. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
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review of agreements between brand-name and generic 
manufacturers, and between different generic 
manufacturers, that are the result of ANDA filings with 
Paragraph IV certifications.32 
B. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS IN 
EUROPE 
As in the United States, a drug manufacturer must 
obtain regulatory approval to market a pharmaceutical 
product in Europe. This is done in one of two ways. First, a 
drug maker may apply with the European Medicines Agency 
(“EMA”) for an authorization that covers all member 
states.33 Second, the drug maker may obtain approval from 
an individual member state and later obtain authorization 
from all the others through the Mutual Recognition 
Procedure (“MRP”).34 
As in the United States, a company may also seek 
patent protection on its drug to obtain the economic 
benefits of a limited monopoly right. However, there is no 
single European Community patent. The European Patent 
Office handles patent applications in a centralized way, but 
after the patent issues, the rights afforded are defined by 
national patent laws and must be enforced separately in 
each member state.35 
The European Community has adopted some, but not 
all, of the features of the Hatch-Waxman regime governing 
generic drug approval in the United States. As in the United 
States, it is possible for a company seeking approval of a 
generic drug to piggyback on the safety and effectiveness 
data submitted by the original manufacturer.36 Also, the 
original manufacturer can get a patent term extension, 
called a Supplementary Protection Certificate (“SPC”), to 
recoup some of the patent term lost during regulatory 
approval.37 
Originally, the patent laws of some European countries 
                                                          
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448–2457 (2003). 
 32. Id. §§ 1111–1118. 
 33. Council Regulation 726/2004, 2004 O.J. (L136) 1 (EC). 
 34. Council Directive 2001/83, 2001 O.J. (L311) 67 (EC). 
 35. COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 6. 
 36. Council Directive 2004/27, 2004 O.J. (L136) 35 (EC). 
 37. Council Regulation 1768/92, 1992 O.J. (L182) 1 (EC). 
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did not exempt testing and other activities by generic drug 
companies for obtaining regulatory approval, and the 
European Court of Justice had upheld injunctions against 
generic companies based on patent infringement theories.38 
However, the European Parliament and Council recently 
enacted a Community-wide analogue to the safe harbor 
provision in the United States that permits generic drug 
testing during the patent term for purposes of obtaining 
regulatory approval.39 However, as yet there are no 
analogous provisions to those in the United States providing 
an immediate route to the courts upon ANDA filing, 
Paragraph IV certifications, thirty-month stays, or 180-day 
marketing exclusivity for successful generic challengers. 
C. THE ASTRAZENECA DECISION 
It is natural to ask whether the various abuses aimed at 
keeping generic drugs off the market, well-documented in 
the United States, have occurred in Europe as well. A clear 
answer came in 2005, when the European Commission 
fined the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca sixty 
million euros for abuse of a dominant position, in violation 
of Article 82 of the European Community Treaty and Article 
54 of the EEA, relating to the company’s conduct in relation 
to its blockbuster drug Losec (generic name omeprazole, 
which is sold as the blockbuster drug Prilosec in the United 
States).40 The conduct was aimed at preventing other 
companies from manufacturing generic versions of Losec, a 
proton-pump inhibitor drug.41 
First, the Commission had to define the relevant 
market. The Commission noted that in the pharmaceutical 
sector price competition is less important than non-price 
competition for two reasons.42 First, the price of drugs, even 
patented drugs, is largely controlled by national health 
authorities who are the sole buyers in each country (i.e., 
                                                          
 38. See Case C-316/95, Generics BV v. Smith, Kline & French Labs. 
Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-3929 (upholding injunction against generic drug 
company against various challenges based on European Community 
Treaty provisions). 
 39. Council Directive 2004/27, supra note 36, art. 10 at 39. 
 40. Commission Decision, supra note 3, at 198. 
 41. Id. at 195. 
 42. Id. at 86–88. 
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monopsony buyers).43 Second, the one who chooses a drug 
is not the payer but the doctor or other health care 
professional.44 
Thus, the Commission relied on product characteristics 
as well as price pattern substitutability to define the 
relevant market and determined that the relevant product 
was Losec itself, since omeprazole is a one-of-a-kind drug 
with a unique mechanism of action.45 As for price pattern 
substitutability, the Commission noted that in the pertinent 
timeframe a similar class of drugs, the histamine H2 
receptor blockers, ostensibly exerted no competitive 
pressure on Losec because the latter’s market share kept 
growing in spite of the fact that it generally cost more than 
the H2 blockers.46 Therefore, the relative product market 
was that for Losec itself.47 
The Commission held that the relevant geographic 
market was each nation in which the drug was sold, since 
the different purchasing policies of each national health 
authority tended to define markets of national scope.48 
The Commission decided that AstraZeneca held a 
dominant position in the relevant markets because 
omeprazole was the first drug of its kind so the company 
enjoyed a first mover advantage.49 For this reason, and 
because of AstraZeneca’s patent rights, it had a strong 
bargaining position even against monopsony buyers.50 
The first abuse involved submission of misleading 
information by AstraZeneca to national patent offices and 
authorities of various member countries for purposes of 
obtaining SPC protection to which the company was not 
entitled.51 The Commission held that this was abuse of a 
dominant position because it was aimed at delaying the 
availability of generic versions of Losec.52 
The second abuse involved the selective de-registration 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 86. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 89–90. 
 46. Id. at 94–95. 
 47. Id. at 114. 
 48. Id. at 113. 
 49. Id. at 120–21. 
 50. Id. at 123–24. 
 51. Id. at 135. 
 52. Id. at 166–67. 
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of marketing authorization of a particular formulation of 
Losec, specifically a capsule, and the simultaneous 
registration of a different formulation in tablet form.53 While 
AstraZeneca argued that it was merely making a business 
decision to switch dosage forms, the Commission relied on 
documents from the company premises to determine that 
there was no purpose for the switch other than to delay the 
market entry of generic versions of Losec, some of which 
were poised to gain marketing authorization of a capsule 
version of omeprazole.54 The Commission was swayed in 
part by the fact that AstraZeneca had only made this switch 
in countries where it was likely to delay the onset of generic 
competition.55 Hence, the Commission determined that the 
selective de-registration was also abuse of a dominant 
position.56 
D. THE RECENT COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY 
The Competition Directorate-General, a branch of the 
European Commission, plays a role parallel to that of the 
Federal Trade Commission in the United States: to enforce 
the competition laws, analogous to the antitrust laws in the 
United States, in order to promote competition and efficient 
markets in the European community for the benefit of the 
economy and consumers.57 The Competition Directorate-
General is currently investigating the competitiveness of the 
pharmaceutical industry in Europe. Preliminary findings 
were made public on November 28, 2008.58 A final report is 
expected to be ready in summer 2009.59 
The investigation was motivated by perceptions that the 
number of novel drugs on the market was declining and 
                                                          
 53. Id. at 170. 
 54. Id. at 168–72. 
 55. Id. at 172. 
 56. Id. at 186. 
 57. Directorate General for Competition, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 
2009). 
 58. COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1. 
 59. Pharmaceuticals Sector Inquiry, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index
.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). 
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that there was often a delay between patent expiration on a 
pioneer drug and the availability of a generic version.60 The 
findings confirmed that both perceptions are accurate.61 
The research revealed that brand-name drug manufacturers 
(or originator companies, as the report refers to them) 
engage in a variety of tactics to delay the entry of generic 
drugs into the marketplace, including accumulating 
multiple patents (“patent clusters”) on the same drug (1300 
patents on a single drug in one case), suing generic drug 
companies for patent infringement, making settlement 
agreements in patent infringement suits that have the effect 
of delaying generic entry, and intervening in regulatory 
procedures for the approval of generic drugs.62 
The investigation calculated that generic entry lagged 
behind patent expiration by an average of seven months for 
the drugs studied.63 The investigators estimated that 
generic drugs were initially priced twenty-five percent lower 
than the brand-name drugs they replaced and that within 
two years the average price of a generic drug was forty 
percent lower than that of the originator drug on average.64 
The researchers further estimated that payers would have 
saved three billion Euros, or more than five percent of the 
cost of the medicines, if generic versions had been available 
immediately upon patent expiration.65 
In the United States, the Hatch-Waxman regime 
encourages patent litigation over brand-name drugs by 
granting 180 days of marketing exclusivity to a generic 
company that makes a Paragraph IV certification and 
successfully challenges a brand-name drug patent and by 
enabling the brand-name manufacturer to sue the generic 
company for patent infringement upon making the 
Paragraph IV certification.66 This system has had the 
unintended consequence of encouraging settlements in 
these patent suits that often involve a delay before the 
generic company begins marketing and a reverse payment 
                                                          
 60. COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 3. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 7–10. 
 63. Id. at 6. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See supra Part II.A. 
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from the brand-name company to the generic company.67 
These settlements have drawn scrutiny and lawsuits from 
the Federal Trade Commission and a vigorous debate 
among courts and scholars about how to analyze the 
settlements under antitrust laws.68 Although the European 
countries do not have analogous provisions, patent 
litigation over drugs abounds in Europe; the Competition 
Directorate-General’s findings noted close to 700 patent 
cases involving the drugs included in the study.69 Although 
generic companies won sixty-two percent of the cases that 
came to a final judgment,70 the average duration of the 
suits studied, 2.8 years,71 suggests the potential for these 
suits to delay generic entry. Also, the research revealed that 
these patent lawsuits often ended in settlement agreements 
with anti-competitive consequences, as happens in the 
United States. Specifically, of about 200 settlement 
agreements scrutinized, forty-eight percent included 
restrictions on the generic’s ability to market.72 Reverse 
payments occurred in more than twenty of these 
settlements, and the total value of these reverse payments 
was over 200 million Euros.73 
The investigators described the legal framework for 
pharmaceutical products in Europe and how it might be 
reformed. It was noted that both originator and generic 
companies favor the creation of a single Community patent 
and a specialized patent judiciary, changes in the regulatory 
framework, and changes in pricing and reimbursement 
rules.74 
                                                          
 67. See supra Part II.A. 
 68. See generally Andersen, supra note 30. 
 69. COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 8. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 9. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 13. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. THE ASTRAZENECA DECISION: APPLYING COMPETITION LAW TO 
CURB ABUSE BY ORIGINATOR COMPANIES 
The Commission’s decision in AstraZeneca is a seminal 
one in several respects.75 The upshot of the decision is that 
it puts the competition laws to service in policing abuses of 
the drug regulatory framework. 
Doctrinally, the case holds that the relevant market for 
a successful blockbuster drug includes only that particular 
drug, at least where the drug has unique attributes like 
omeprazole that render it relatively insensitive to price 
competition with similar drugs. If so-called “me-too” drugs 
are available, that is, other drugs of the same class with 
very similar pharmacological properties, perhaps these 
drugs would have to be included in the relevant product 
definition. But where a drug is the only one of its kind, it 
should be relatively easy to show that the manufacturer is 
in a dominant position after AstraZeneca. Moreover, even 
though the buyer may be in a monopsony position because 
of nationalized health care, the maker of a one-of-a-kind 
drug has plenty of bargaining power if the drug has an 
important function. Because no one can force a company to 
manufacture a drug, the maker of a blockbuster drug 
probably has the upper hand. Thus the Commission was 
probably correct that AstraZeneca was in a dominant 
position. 
The more important question is whether the company 
abused its dominant position. Article 82 provides some 
examples of abuse of a dominant position: 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices 
or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, 
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
                                                          
 75. For an excellent analysis of the AstraZeneca case, see Matteo 
Negrinotti, Abuse of Regulatory Procedures in the Intellectual Property 
Context: The AstraZeneca Case, 29 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 446 (2008). 
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connection with the subject of such contracts.76 
Neither of AstraZeneca’s practices, the misleading 
information to obtain SPCs and the selective de-registration, 
seem to fit into these pigeonholes. However, Article 82 
indicates that abuse “may” consist of these practices, 
suggesting that the listed abuses are not exclusive.77 The 
Commission decision makes clear that “abuse” is not 
confined to the listed examples. 
Moreover, American antitrust law has condemned 
practices similar to the ones at issue. For instance, 
fraudulent procurement of a patent is a violation of section 
2 of the Sherman Act if the other elements of 
monopolization are present.78 Also, the Federal Trade 
Commission has determined that brand-name drug 
companies that improperly list patents for purposes of 
obtaining thirty-month stays and delaying generic entry 
violate section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.79 
Thus, to the extent that AstraZeneca did mislead patent 
officials to obtain patent extensions to which it was not 
entitled, the abuse would likely violate the American 
antitrust laws. 
As for the selective de-registration of Losec, a similar 
case in the United States involved a brand-name company 
switching approved formulations in anticipation of a generic 
entry.80 The court held that this could be a violation of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, subject to a rule of reason 
analysis.81 Under a rule of reason analysis, a court weighs 
all the circumstances of a case to determine if a particular 
practice is an antitrust violation, including such factors as 
information about the relevant business; the practice’s 
nature, effects, and history; and the presence of market 
                                                          
 76. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, art. 82, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 65. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 
U.S. 172, 175 (1965). 
 79. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 135 F.T.C. 444 (2003); Biovail 
Corp., 134 F.T.C. 407 (2002). 
 80. See Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d. 408, 
416–17 (D. Del. 2006). 
 81. Id. at 420–24. 
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power.82 This analysis is to determine if the practice is pro-
competitive or anti-competitive.83 
It is evident, then, that antitrust law in the United 
States has been applied to practices such as those 
AstraZeneca used, so the Commission’s application of the 
competition law had foreign precedent. Indeed, the 
Commission’s use of Article 82 is a step toward 
harmonization of American and European law regarding 
efforts to forestall generic drug entry. 
It is important for courts to be able to distinguish 
legitimate business strategies from illegitimate ones. 
Obtaining SPCs or switching approval for drug formulations 
could certainly be part of legitimate business strategies. The 
Commission Decision seemed to recognize this in that it 
noted that a change in market authorization for a 
formulation would not normally be considered an abuse.84 
Critically, the Commission based its conclusions on both 
practices on the fact that they were aimed at delaying 
generic entry into the marketplace.85 
 To determine exactly where the line is between a 
legitimate business practice and abuse of a dominant 
position, it is instructive to examine another recent case, 
SYFAIT v. GlaxoSmithKline.86 In that 2005 case the 
European Court of Justice held that a refusal by a large 
pharmaceutical company to fill orders from a wholesaler 
was not necessarily abuse of a dominant position.87 The 
Court noted the unique aspects of the pharmaceutical 
industry, including the large framework of legal regulation, 
the economics of the industry, and the consequences of 
parallel trade for consumers.88 The Court held that a 
restriction on parallel trade based on a refusal to supply to 
a wholesaler beyond its specific needs was not an abuse if it 
was “reasonable and proportionate.”89 The Court 
                                                          
 82. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2712–13 (2007). 
 83. Id. at 2713. 
 84. Commission Decision, supra note 3, at 170–71. 
 85. Id. at 145, 175. 
 86. Case C-53/03, Syfait v. Glaxo Smith Klein AEVE, 2005 E.C.R. I-
4609 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs). 
 87. Id. ¶ 105. 
 88. Id. ¶¶ 75–100. 
 89. Id. ¶ 100. 
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determined that in the particular case at hand this 
condition was satisfied because the restriction on parallel 
trade would be minimal and the company needed to 
maintain enough supply on hand for orders from other 
wholesalers.90 The Court noted that a refusal to supply 
might be found to be an abuse of a dominant position if it 
had anti-competitive effects other than a minimal 
restriction on parallel trade.91 
The words “reasonable and proportionate” are Delphic; 
they indicate in appropriate Article 82 cases an analysis is 
taken similar to the rule of reason that American courts 
use.92 Moreover, the case suggests that courts should 
consider the unique aspects of the pharmaceutical industry 
in this analysis. 
Viewing AstraZeneca through the lens of SYFAIT, then, 
it is difficult to fathom how supplying misleading 
information to patent offices could qualify as a reasonable 
and proportionate measure. It seems axiomatic that 
conduct that is independently wrong or unlawful is not 
reasonable and proportionate. Changing the marketing 
authorization for a drug formulation, on the other hand, 
could easily be regarded as reasonable and proportionate if 
there was a business justification other than stalling 
generic competitors. The Commission was heavily swayed 
by the fact that AstraZeneca had only changed its 
marketing authorization in countries where this move 
would have the likely effect of preventing impending generic 
approval. From this fact it might be inferred that 
AstraZeneca’s main motive was to stymie generic 
competition. 
AstraZeneca and SYFAIT offer twin lessons to 
pharmaceutical companies and courts. The first is that in 
Europe, as in the United States, more or less overt efforts to 
prevent generic drug approval run afoul of the competition 
laws. If a particular action seems likely to restrain generic 
competition, brand-name companies must take care to 
document the legitimate business reasons for such action. 
Second, a lesson for the courts is not to treat these cases 
                                                          
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. ¶ 104. 
 92. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68 (1911). 
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too superficially. In some cases, such as an attempt to 
procure patent rights by misleading patent officials, the 
conduct can be condemned without much ado. But in other 
cases involving conduct not otherwise wrong or unlawful, 
courts should determine if there is a legitimate business 
reason for the conduct and if any anti-competitive effect 
involved is reasonable and proportionate in light of such a 
reason. 
B. THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The Competition Directorate-General’s pharmaceutical 
sector inquiry reflects dissatisfaction on the part of policy 
makers with the state of the pharmaceutical industry 
today.93 Two questions emerge: (1) what ails the industry, 
and (2) what can policymakers (including courts) do about 
it? 
In answering the first question, it is important to 
understand the complexity of the problems. For example, 
the inquiry made the preliminary findings that the number 
of new drugs going to market has been declining lately, and 
that generic approval often lags behind patent expiration on 
these drugs.94 Even putting these two problems side-by-
side, however, the preliminary report did not acknowledge 
that they involve conflicting priorities. Because generic drug 
approval brings competition to the marketplace and hence 
reduces the price of a drug, a necessary consequence is that 
anything that speeds up generic approval tends to reduce 
incentives for originator companies to discover new drugs. 
While the Competition Directorate-General’s findings 
seemed to focus on examples of practices by brand-name 
drug manufacturers that thwart generic competition,95 
generic companies are involved in some anti-competitive 
practices too, such as collusive settlement agreements to 
patent litigation suits. Brand-name manufacturers face a 
host of problems of their own: fewer new drugs in the 
approval pipeline, competition from generics, a less-friendly 
regulatory environment, and the potential changes in policy 
the new U.S. presidential administration and Congress 
could enact such as drug price controls or re-importation of 
                                                          
 93. See generally COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1. 
 94. See supra Part II.D. 
 95. See supra Part II.D. 
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drugs from Canada.96 Many drug companies are directing a 
larger portion of their drug development efforts and sales 
toward developing countries such as China and India, in 
part because of the less favorable legal and regulatory 
environments in both Europe and the United States.97 
Optimal policy therefore requires not only setting a proper 
balance between the brand-name and the generic 
industries, but also legal and regulatory reforms that make 
the business environment more favorable for the whole 
pharmaceutical industry overall. 
The inquiry found about 700 patent litigation cases 
involving the drugs studied.98 This suggests that adoption 
of additional incentives to encourage litigation over drug 
patents, such as the Paragraph IV certification and 180-day 
marketing exclusivity for successful generic challengers in 
the United States, is unnecessary since patent litigation 
abounds even without these inducements. The inquiry 
found that generic companies are already testing the limits 
of patent rights, and successfully; generics won sixty-two 
percent of the cases in which a final judgment was 
reached.99 As in the United States, the inquiry found that 
drug patent litigation often ended in settlement agreements 
involving restrictions on the generic company’s ability to 
market or reverse payments from the brand-name company 
to the generic company.100 On the basis of this finding, the 
Competition Directorate-General should begin to assume 
the same role in policing these agreements as the Federal 
Trade Commission in the United States does. While it is not 
clear to what extent collusive settlement agreements 
contribute to the lag in generic entry into the marketplace, 
the situation in the United States indicates that these 
agreements should be carefully monitored for anti-
competitive effects. 
To achieve greater savings from generic drugs, the 
Commission should consider reform to the patchwork of 
                                                          
 96. See Winds of Change, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 75–76; Racing 
Down the Pyramid, ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2008, at 76. 
 97. See Racing Down the Pyramid, supra note 96, at 76. 
 98. See COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 8. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 9. 
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reference pricing, price caps, and other regulations that set 
generic prices. Economists believe this system is less 
effective at producing low generic prices than the free 
market system in place in the United States.101 
As for improving the business climate for 
pharmaceuticals overall, the preliminary findings from the 
inquiry identified several areas in which all stakeholders 
agree reforms are needed: creation of a single European 
Community patent, regulatory reform, and changes to 
pricing and reimbursement schedules.102 There may be 
limits to what policy reform can accomplish; some of the 
industry’s problems may be the results of the blockbuster 
business model having outlived its usefulness and the need 
to adopt new business strategy. However, there is 
widespread agreement that legal reforms are needed. 
Last but not least, there is certainly a role for the 
competition laws to play in drug policy. The sector inquiry 
found that various practices with potential anti-competitive 
effects are common in Europe, just as they are in the 
United States.103 AstraZeneca and SYFAIT establish the 
framework for applying the competition laws in the 
pharmaceutical context.104 Here as elsewhere, it is 
important for courts to see the laws not just as a tool for 
preventing brand-name company abuses but rather as an 
instrument for maintaining a proper balance between 
brand-name and generic drug companies and encouraging 
a favorable environment for the pharmaceutical industry 
overall. To this end, in considering whether a particular 
anti-competitive effect is reasonable and proportionate to 
the business interests involved, a court might consider such 
broad policy factors as the state of the brand-name industry 
or the trend in new drug approvals. If the balance seems to 
have shifted too far in favor of generic drug makers, for 
example, a court might be less inclined to condemn a 
particular practice by a brand-name company. Encouraging 
new drug development and approval is just as important a 
policy goal as encouraging generic approval. So in applying 
the competition laws in pharmaceutical cases, courts 
                                                          
 101. See Patently Absurd, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2008, at 82. 
 102. COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
 103. See supra Part II.D. 
 104. See supra Part III.A. 
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should be as mindful of the policy background as SYFAIT 
exhorted them to be of the factual background. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The AstraZeneca matter and the European 
Commission’s findings both point to the unsatisfactory 
condition of the pharmaceutical industry in Europe. There 
is legitimate cause for concern over tactics by brand-name 
drug manufacturers to delay the entry of generic drugs into 
the market. However, the woes facing the drug industry are 
complex and the brand-name companies should not be 
singled out as the culprits. Rather, policy makers should 
consider a whole package of legal and regulatory reforms to 
improve the business climate for both brand-name and 
generic companies. 
One policy lever available to maintain a competitive 
balance between brand-name and generic manufacturers is 
the competition laws. As in the AstraZeneca case, the 
competition laws can be used to restrain abuses of patents 
or regulatory procedures intended to forestall generic 
competition. However, courts should be mindful of the 
challenges facing pioneer drug companies too and should 
take care not to shift the balance too far in favor of generic 
drug companies. Like the United States antitrust laws, the 
European competition laws are a flexible instrument with 
interpretive leeway that courts can bend to different policy 
objectives as the situation requires. This has the advantage 
of not requiring new legislation to implement new policy. 
 
